Dropbox security white paper1/13/2024 ![]() ![]() I'm trying to find middle-ground and balance.įor everyone who is saying ' I don't use cloud services' or ' I build my own', what kind of third-party auditing do you have in place to verify your security is as strong as you expect it to be? Do you encrypt all material prior to upload to your datacenter? Do you review audit logs of when a file was modified or accessed? Do you receive alerts of IP addresses accessed your data, and whether it was accessed in different locations by different systems which are geographically separated and that access would have been impossible given the time from when you had previously accessed the data?įor everyone who says ' I don't use cloud services' I'm surprised that you've created a spiceworks account, which is another person's server hosting your data, or as I would call it - A Cloud Service Provider. Unfortunately, my personal opinions and what I need to provide professionally for my users is currently on a collision course. I gladly sacrifice convenience for security and keep my stuff safely on my own (private, not taking to the internet) NAS at home. ![]() The cloud is too unknown, too vulnerable, and too risky. How do I know they are not looking at my files and selling my photos? How do I know they are backing them up and making them "last forever"? Because they told me so? The phrase "you get what you pay for" comes to mind right now.Ĭall me "old school" but I like what I can control and what I know is happening with my stuff. Those companies are looking out for their own bottom line!Įven if security were better from the outside world, I still don't trust inside the companies. They buy into this false sense of security that someone else is "looking out for" and "keeping safe" their file, pictures, or whatever. The public, cloud-based storage solutions have been heralded as so safe and many buy into that farce. The keys used to encrypt and decrypt the data are derived when the user logs in via their master password and/or biometrics. In Keeper's cloud file storage, data is encrypted and decrypted ONLY on the client device. Keeper is a zero-knowledge cloud storage provider and is not affected. This token is stored on each of the devices a user connects to their cloud storage device, and even if encrypted, it can be broken into and stolen by attackers. MITC attacks don't rely on vulnerabilities in the syncing applications themselves, nor on security holes in the cloud storage server, but act on a design flaw.īecause of the way these services were built, not requiring a password every time a file is synced, a token is used instead to authorize these operations without constantly hampering the user. The research paper details a new technique called MITC (Man in the Cloud), which allows attackers to intrude popular cloud storage services like Box, Dropbox, Google Drive, and OneDrive. A report by Imperva shows how an attacker could easily get their grubby hands on cloud storage and synchronization accounts, without even needing the user's password, and use them in their illicit activities. ![]()
0 Comments
Leave a Reply.AuthorWrite something about yourself. No need to be fancy, just an overview. ArchivesCategories |